Famous First Bubbles著名泡沫 pdf mobi 下载 kindle 115盘 chm 阿里云 rb

From The Industry Standard

Now that tech stocks are in a rut, it's comforting to tell war stories from a different era. A favorite is the tale of how market madness in 1636 allegedly drove Dutch citizens to squander enough provisi*** to last a family a year for a single rare tulip bulb.

Indeed, tulip mania has become a catchall for irrational market behavior, particularly since the Nasdaq tanked in April.

Such is human nature, as Charles Mackay wrote in his classic Extraordinary Popular Delusi*** and the Madness of Crowds, "that w*** communities suddenly fix their minds upon one object, and go mad in its pursuit." Had Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan been around, he too would have wagged his finger at Holland's irrational exuberance, right?

Not so fast, says economist Peter Garber in his slim yet fascinating book Famous First Bubbles. There's almost always a better explanation than crowd psychology for sky-high asset prices, he says. Garber, a Brown University economics professor and global strategist for Deutsche Bank, takes a mere 160 pages to debunk the myths surrounding tulip mania, as well as its sisters in mythology, the South Sea bubble and the Mississippi bubble.

There is a difference, Garbe***rites, between uncertainty about the future - which drives innovators, risk-taking entrepreneurs and eventually markets - and mob psychology. The Netherlands, for example, was a sophisticated trading center, with well-developed commodity markets. That rare varieties of tulip bulbs could fetch high prices among professional traders was not irrational. The tulips could be used to grow many more valuable hybrids and often earned their purchasers far more than they invested. Indeed, this pattern still exists today. In 1987, serious traders paid as much as $500,000 for a new breed of tulip, fully intending to make good on the investment.

That highly specialized market is not to be confused with the more speculative futures contracts made by Dutch laymen. Hunkered down in taverns, they traded common bulbs, and for one month in early 1637 provided the basis for all those hair-raising anecdotes.

But even those deals, Garber points out, were not spurred by madness. They were nonenforceable gambles on futures contracts by people who knew their margins would never be called. Indeed, when the government suspended all such contracts in early 1637, authorities let buyers off the hook on payment of 3.5 percent of the contract price - hence the legend of a disastrous price decline. "This was no more than a meaningless winter drinking game," Garbe***rites, "played by a plague-ridden population... ."

Indeed, the Dutch economy chugged along, undamaged by the "bubble," for another 10 years.

Then why the legend of a market gone berserk? Garber does a great job tracing all anecdotes back to a single source: the Dutch government, which spun the tale to discourage future speculation.

Although Garber's book is stuffed with potentially eye-glazing numbers and charts, he lays out his argument with an engaging whiff of irony. It is an argument especially worth noting as high-tech portfolios continue to slide. Crying "bubble" is the easy way out, Garber says, preferred by those who believe individuals are not to be trusted in determining the value of markets - Greenspan's famous "irrational exuberance" is a perfect example. But without the kind of speculation seen today and, yes, in 1636, there would be no new economy, because milli*** of investors have to bet on the next new thing to push along those few companies who ultimately succeed.

Vretace ix

Ⅰ The Bubble Interpretation

Ⅱ The Tulipmania Legend

1 A Political and Economic Background

2 The Traditional Image of Tulipmania

3 Where Does the Tulipmania Legend Come From?

4 Establishment Attitudes toward Futures Markets and Short Sellin9：The Source of the Pamphlets

5 The Bubonic Plague

6 The Broken Tulip

7 The Bulb Market，1634-1637

8 Some Characterization of the Data

9 Post—Collapse Tulip Prices

10 Bulb Prices in Later Centuries

11 Was This Episode a."Tulipmania" ?

Ⅲ The Macro Bubbles

12 A Preliminary View：The Mississippi and South SeaBubbles

13 John Law and the Fundamentals of the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles

14 John Law's Finance Operati***

15 A Rehash of Mississippi MarketFundamentals

16 Law's Shadow：The South Sea Bubble

17 South Sea Finance Operati***

18 Fundamentals of the South Sea Company

19 Conclusion

Appendix l：The Tulipmania in the Popular and Economics Li***ture

Appendix2:The seventeenth-century tulip price data

Notes

References

Index

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由于经济现象固有的复杂性，这样的解释往往很难形成。但是，泡沫却常常被人们作为一种最先的理论解释而不是最后的诉诸路径。确实，“泡沫”特征应该是最后一种解释，因为对发生的事件来说，泡沫属于一种“无解释”，只是我们附加给某一金融事件的一个名称而已，且我们并没有对这一金融现象进行充分的理解。用大众心理学来解释永远是意思不确定和无法测量的，它只会使我们的解释陷入同语反复，在一种自我欺骗中试图说出比承认困惑更多的东西。

金融市场的观察家们被那些重大投机事件的辉煌灿烂所吸引，他们草率地用泡沫来加以解释，而忽视了对潜在的市场基本面的考察。

书籍介绍

The jargon of economics and finance contains numerous colorful terms for market-asset prices at odds with any reasonable economic explanation. Examples include "bubble," "tulipmania," "chain letter," "Ponzi scheme," "panic," "crash," "herding," and "irrational exuberance." Although such a term suggests that an event is inexplicably crowd-driven, what it really means, claims Peter Garber, is that we have gr***ed a near-empty explanation rather than expend the effort to understand the event.In this book Garber offers market-fundamental explanati*** for the three most famous bubbles: the Dutch Tulipmania (1634-1637), the Mississippi Bubble (1719-1720), and the closely connected South Sea Bubble (1720). He focuses most closely on the Tulipmania because it is the event that most modern observers view as clearly crazy. Comparing the pattern of price declines for initially rare eighteenth-century bulbs to that of seventeenth-century bulbs, he concludes that the extremely high prices for rare bulbs and their rapid decline reflects normal pricing behavior. In the cases of the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles, he describes the asset markets and financial manipulati*** involved in these episodes and casts them as market fundamentals.